

# Risk, Return, and Cash Flow Characteristics of Private Equity Investments in Infrastructure

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## Introduction

In this paper, we analyze the risk, return and cash flow characteristics of infrastructure investments and compare them to non-infrastructure investments. It is generally argued in the literature that infrastructure investments offer typical characteristics such as long-term, stable and predictable, inflation-linked returns with low correlation to other assets (Inderst 2009, p. 7). However, these characteristics attributed to infrastructure investments have not yet been proven empirically. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap and provide a more thorough understanding of infrastructure returns and cash flow characteristics.

One of the main obstacles in infrastructure research has been the lack of available data. In this paper we make use of a unique and novel dataset of global infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments done by unlisted funds. Overall, we have information on 363 fully-realized infrastructure and 11,223 non-infrastructure deals. The special feature of the data is that they contain the full history of cash flows for each deal. This enables us to study the risk, return and cash flow characteristics of infrastructure investments and to draw comparisons between infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments.

Our results indicate that infrastructure deals have a performance that is uncorrelated to macroeconomic development and that is higher than that of non-infrastructure deals despite lower default frequencies. However,

we do not find that infrastructure deals offer cash flows that are more stable, longer term, inflation-linked or uncorrelated to public equity markets. To measure "stability", we introduce a measure of the variability of cash outflows from the portfolio company to the fund. We also find evidence that infrastructure assets are higher levered but that they have not been exposed to overinvestment as often stated. Finally, we offer some evidence that higher returns might be driven by higher market risk or higher political risk. However, returns in the infrastructure sector might also be driven by defective privatization mechanisms.

This article contributes to the emerging literature on infrastructure financing. Recent publications in this area include Newell and Peng (2007, 2008), Dechant and Finkenzeller (2009) or Sawant (2010a). These previous studies exclusively focus on data from listed infrastructure stocks, indices of unlisted infrastructure investments or infrastructure project bonds. In contrast, we are the first to use data of unlisted infrastructure fund investments.

The article is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights the importance and need for infrastructure assets and summarizes what forms of infrastructure investments are available for investors. Section 3 describes the main investment characteristics that are assumed to be infrastructure-specific and derives the hypotheses on infrastructure fund investments to be tested in this paper. Section 4 describes our database and sample

selection. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the findings and gives an outlook on future research in this area.

**Infrastructure investments**

**2.1 The infrastructure investment gap**

Several studies estimate that in the course of the 21st century, increasing amounts of money need to be spent on infrastructure assets globally. In this context, infrastructure is generally understood as assets in the transportation, telecommunication, electricity and water sectors (OECD 2007, p. 21). Sometimes other energy-related assets such as oil and gas transportation and storage or social institutions such as hospitals, schools or prisons are included as well.

These estimates are based on an increasing need for such assets in developing countries due to population growth and economic development. Developing countries need more of the existing infrastructure as well as new infrastructure, such as better telecommunication or transportation systems. In addition, developed markets will exhibit increasing demand for infrastructure assets driven not by population growth but by replacement of existing but aging infrastructure systems. Moreover, technological progress is an important factor for emerging and developed countries alike as it enables and requires more spending on infrastructure assets. For example, power grids must be upgraded to match the special requirements of newly installed offshore wind energy parks. Taken together, the worldwide demand for infrastructure investments between 2005 and 2030 could be as high as USD 70 trillion according to the OECD (OECD 2007, p. 22 and p. 97).


Although the increasing demand for infrastructure assets is generally recognized, the supply is constrained by a lack of financing resources: Governments of emerging countries often are yet capable of financing and administering the high volume of targeted projects, whereas governments of developed countries have limited budgets for infrastructure due to rising social expenditures – partly due to ageing populations (OECD 2007, p. 24). While infrastructure assets have historically been, and still are to a large extent, financed by the public sector, this traditional financing source is unlikely to cover the large estimated investment needs (OECD 2007, p. 29). This gap between the projected needs for infrastructure assets and the supply is popularly referred to as the “infrastructure investment gap” (OECD 2007, p. 14).

A natural solution is to make the infrastructure sectors more accessible for private investors. Pension funds of OECD countries have assets under management of about USD 25 trillion (OECD 2010, p. 2) representing a weighted average asset-to-GDP ratio of 67.1 percent in 2009 (OECD 2010, p. 8). This suggests that institutional investors, such as pension funds or insurance companies, could significantly narrow the infrastructure investment gap if they invested a portion of their assets in infrastructure assets. Some pension funds have already started doing this with some individual funds showing an infrastructure share of over 10 percent (Inderst 2009, p. 3 and p. 13; Beeferman 2008, p. 16). Nevertheless, only a small proportion of overall pension assets are allocated to infrastructure (OECD 2010, p. 37).

**2.2 Forms of investment**

Investors not only have to decide on the optimal weight of infrastructure assets in their portfolio but also on the form of investment within the infrastructure sector. The various forms of investment have different profiles regarding minimum-capital requirements, time horizon and risk exposures (such as liquidity or political risk). Figure 1 provides a schematic overview.

Figure 1. Most common forms of infrastructure investment



Notes: The figure shows the most common forms of infrastructure investments grouped into the categories listed / unlisted and direct / indirect investments. It also shows schematically the exposure to the different risks associated with them.

**Direct investments** into infrastructure assets such as toll roads or power plants usually require the longest time horizon for an investor since infrastructure assets have long lives - up to 60 years on average (Rickards 2008). Some investments can last as long as 99 years (Beeferman 2008, p. 7). Due to the physical nature of these assets, direct investments cannot easily be sold and thus bear high liquidity risk. Since infrastructure assets are generally very capital-intensive, they require large capital outlays. Furthermore, committing a large amount of capital over a long period of time into a single infrastructure asset exposes the investor to high political and regulatory risk. Overall, only a few investors such as insurance companies or pension funds are capable of making investments with such characteristics and only recently have these investments become more popular with them (Inderst 2009, p. 3). There are special forms of direct infrastructure investments, the most prominent being those using Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or project finance structures (see Väillä 2005 and Esty 2003 and 2010, respectively, for overviews of these forms of investment).

The disadvantage of a high capital requirement can be eliminated to a large extent by investing in direct and indirect **listed securities** of companies that operate in sectors relevant to infrastructure. This makes portfolio diversification easier, reducing exposure to single-country political and regulatory risk. Moreover, the use of listed securities reduces liquidity risk. Listed securities also allow a shorter investment time horizon. Indexes of listed infrastructure securities and listed infrastructure funds provide well diversified infrastructure exposure.

**Unlisted infrastructure funds** also provide diversified exposure and enable smaller investors to participate in unlisted infrastructure assets through smaller minimum capital requirements than unlisted direct investments. Starting with the launch of the first fund of this kind in 1993, this has become one of the most specialized and rapidly growing forms of infrastructure investment, comprising of over 70 funds with an average fund size of USD 3.3 billion in 2008 (Preqin 2008; Orr 2007; and Inderst 2009, p. 11).

Like typical private equity funds, such funds are usually structured as Limited Partnerships. The fund manager – called General Partner – collects money from investors, the Limited Partners, and invests it in portfolio companies on their behalf over a specified period of time. When the portfolio companies are sold the committed capital is returned to the investor in the form of distributions (cash outflows from the point of view of the fund manager). In this paper, we refer to a “deal” as a single investment by the fund through which the fund participates in the underlying portfolio company. Thereby the deal size can range between 0 percent and 100 percent of the asset value.

In our analysis, we concentrate on single deals by such funds and on the cash flow between the portfolio company and the fund. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to provide empirical evidence on this form of investment from an academic point of view.

Almost all of the previously mentioned forms of investment can be carried out using **debt or equity** financing. Our sample of infrastructure fund investments contains only equity investments since equity funds dominate the market.

From a theoretical perspective, however, infrastructure projects are expected to be debt-financed to a significant extent as *ceteris paribus*, the agency cost of debt is lower compared to non-infrastructure projects. According to the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, a high level of debt has a disciplinary effect on managers and prevents them from investing in negative net-present-value (NPV) projects (Jensen 1986). Sawant (2010b, pp. 73-81) argues that this mechanism is particularly relevant for infrastructure assets. First, they allegedly provide stable cash flows that can be used to cover a higher level of debt obligations. Second, infrastructure assets have fewer growth options. This further hinders management from over-investing in negative NPV projects, as investment decisions can be monitored more easily by external claimholders.

In the next section we propose eight hypotheses on commonly held infrastructure-specific characteristics that we will test with our data of equity fund investments in Section 5.

### 3. Hypotheses

Infrastructure is often referred to as a new asset class in the context of asset allocation. However, this is not a universally held belief. In fact, there is no academic consensus on the exact definition of an "asset class". However, most publications on infrastructure investments agree that such investments exhibit special investment characteristics. We do not address the question of whether infrastructure investment is an asset class in this paper. Instead, we analyse equity infrastructure fund investments to determine whether this form of investment offers unique investment characteristics by analysing whether the most commonly postulated characteristics can be observed empirically at the deal level.

Infrastructure companies often operate in monopolistic markets or show properties of natural monopolies. It is intuitive that such companies also exhibit specific financing and investment characteristics based on their special economic characteristics. We group our eight infrastructure-specific hypotheses (H1, H2, ..., H8) into three classes: asset characteristics, risk-return profile, and performance drivers

#### 3.1 Asset characteristics

*H1: Infrastructure investments have a longer time horizon than non-infrastructure investments.*

This intuitive hypothesis is based on the aforementioned long life spans of the underlying infrastructure assets (see Section 2.2). Thus we expect that on average, investors hold infrastructure investments for longer than non-infrastructure investments to mimic the long-term asset characteristic.

*H2: Infrastructure investments require more capital than non-infrastructure investments.*

Infrastructure assets are large and require a high amount of capital when being acquired (Sawant 2010b). Therefore one would expect that on average, investments in such assets require a high amount of capital, too. Specifically, we expect that investors commit more capital per infrastructure deal than per non-infrastructure deal.

#### 3.2 Risk-return profile

*H3: Infrastructure investments provide stable cash flows.*

The special economic characteristics result in inelastic and stable demand for infrastructure services (Sawant 2010b, p. 35). This intuitively supports the claim that infrastructure assets are bond-like investments with stable and thus predictable cash flows. We would like to stress that the economic characteristics of infrastructure assets also imply special regulatory and legal characteristics. For example, a regulated natural monopoly with rate-of-return regulation may provide stable cash flows and returns by law (Helm and Tindall 2009, p. 414). A similar case is that of a contract-led project, for example for a power plant, whereby a long-term power purchase agreement enables the operator of the plant to forecast output and cash flows far into the future (Haas 2005, p. 8). Of course, this stability only holds if the contract partner does not default and if legal or regulatory conditions do not change.

*H4: Infrastructure investments are low-risk and low-return investments.*

Despite high political risk, it is often stated that infrastructure investments have low risk from an investor's point of view and thus low default rates (Inderst 2009, p. 7). Due to low risk, investors require a low return in compensation. We measure risk by historical default frequency. The multiple and total internal rates of return (IRR) are applied as measures of return. Therefore, we expect lower default frequencies and lower multiples and IRRs for infrastructure deals than for non-infrastructure deals.

*H5: Within infrastructure investments there is a different risk-return profile between greenfield and brownfield investments.*

This is because greenfield investment assets face a relatively high level of business risk, including construction risk, uncertain demand, and specific risks in the early years after privatizations. For development projects or projects in emerging markets, total return consists mostly of capital growth with a premium for associated risk factors. Investment in the construction phase of a toll road is one example of a development stage infrastructure asset, with initial investors taking construction and, possibly, traffic demand risk.

In contrast, brownfield investments – referring to infrastructure assets that are established businesses with a history of consistent and predictable cash flows – are perceived to be the lowest-return and lowest-risk sector of infrastructure investing. Demand patterns, regulatory conditions and industry dynamics are well understood or at least predictable. An existing toll road is a good example of this kind of infrastructure investments. Once it has been in operation for two or three years, it is likely to have an established, steady traffic profile (Buchner et al. 2008, p. 46). Therefore we expect brownfield investments to offer lower default frequencies as well as lower returns on average.

#### 3.3 Performance drivers

*H6: Overinvestment has lowered returns on infrastructure investments.*

There is empirical evidence for an effect called "money chasing deals" in private-equity investments at the deal level (Gompers and Lerner, 2000) as well as at the fund level (Diller and Kaserer, 2009). This means that private equity can be subject to overinvestment, so that asset prices go up and performance goes down. Since the infrastructure deals in our data are made by private-equity funds, we expect that overinvestment in the broader private equity market entails overinvestment for infrastructure deals. We therefore expect that capital inflows into the private equity market lower the subsequent returns not only of non-infrastructure deals but also of infrastructure deals.

*H7: Infrastructure investments provide inflation-linked returns.*

Owners or operators of infrastructure assets often implement ex ante an inflation-linked revenue component. This enables them to quickly pass through cost increases to the users of the infrastructure assets and thus maintain profit margins and levels of returns. If non-infrastructure companies do so less quickly, we expect infrastructure deals to be more positively influenced by the level of inflation. In the case of natural monopolies, pricing power can also be a source of inflation-linked returns (Martin 2010, p. 23). However, due to regulation it is not totally clear to what extent infrastructure providers are allowed to adjust prices for inflation or exert market power.

*H8: Infrastructure investments provide returns uncorrelated with the macroeconomic environment.*

Due to the stable demand for infrastructure services outlined in H3 above, revenues from infrastructure services are not correlated to fluctuations in economic growth. Therefore we expect infrastructure investments to provide returns that are less correlated with macroeconomic developments than non-infrastructure investments. As a corollary, we expect infrastructure investments to be uncorrelated to the performance of other asset classes such as public equity markets. The latter correlation also gives an indication of the market risk of the investment. The sensitivity of returns to a market index as a proxy for the overall investable market is an important parameter in the choice of financial portfolios. Once again, regulation can influence both relationships, though it is not clear in what direction.

**3.4 Other performance drivers**

Apart from infrastructure-specific hypotheses we also examine differences in regions of investment and industry sectors. Within the infrastructure sector, these variables can, for example, show the differing regional characteristics of the infrastructure market or show how homogenous the sector is across infrastructure assets. Since infrastructure assets have special economic characteristics, we also expect that these and other factors show different impacts on performance compared to non-infrastructure assets.

**4. Data**

Before testing our hypotheses as well as regional and sector-related characteristics, we give a comprehensive overview of the underlying data.

**4.1 Data source**

The dataset used for the empirical analysis is provided by the Center for Private Equity Research (CEPRES), a private consulting firm established in 2001 as a spin-off from the University of Frankfurt. Today it is supported by Technische Universität München and Deutsche Bank Group. A unique feature of CEPRES is the collection of information on the monthly cash flows generated by private equity deals.

CEPRES obtains data from private-equity firms that make use of a service called “The Private Equity Analyzer”. Participating firms sign a contract that stipulates that they are giving the correct cash flows (before fees) generated for each investment they have made in the past. In return, the firm receives statistics such as risk-adjusted performance measures. These statistics are used by the firm internally for various purposes like bonus payments or strengths/weaknesses analysis. Importantly, and unlike other data collectors, CEPRES does not benchmark private equity firms to peer groups. This improves data accuracy and representativeness as it eliminates incentives to manipulate cash flows or cherry-pick past investments. In 2010, this programme has reached coverage of around 1,200 private-equity funds including more than 25,000 equity and mezzanine deals worldwide. Earlier versions of this dataset have been utilized in previous studies. For this paper, CEPRES granted us access to all liquidated investments in their database as of September 2009. We thus have access to a comprehensive and accurate

panel of total cash flow streams generated by infrastructure and non-infrastructure private-equity investments. This unique feature enables us to construct precise measures of the investment performance, which is essential for comparing the risk, return and cash flow characteristics of infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments.

**4.2 Sample selection**

We eliminate mezzanine deals and all deals that are not fully realized yet. By doing this we can concentrate on cash flows of pure equity deals that actually occurred and do not have to question the validity of valuations for deals that have not had their exit. Our data contain deals that have had their initial investment and final exit between January 1971 and September 2009. We split the remaining sample into infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals according to an infrastructure definition following Bitsch et al. (2010). Hereby, infrastructure deals are defined as investments in physical networks within the following sectors: Transport (including aviation,

Table 1: Split of infrastructure sample into industry sectors and stages of investment

Sector (sub-sector)	Region / stage of investment	Percentage of total within infrastructure sample (broken down by region/stage)
<b>Alternative energy</b> (renewable electricity)		<b>3.6</b>
	Asia	7.7
	Europe	46.2
	North America	30.8
	Rest of World/Unspecified	15.4
		100.0
	Venture capital	23.1
	Private equity	76.9
<b>Transport</b> (aviation, railway, road- and marine Systems)		<b>12.9</b>
	Asia	23.4
	Europe	48.9
	North America	23.4
	Rest of World/Unspecified	4.3
		100.0
	VC	17.0
	PE	83.0
<b>Natural resources &amp; energy</b> (oil, gas, tele-heating, electricity)		<b>24.8</b>
	Asia	6.7
	Europe	53.3
	North America	23.3
	Rest of World/Unspecified	16.7
		100.0
	VC	46.7
	PE	53.3
<b>Telecommunication</b> (data transmission, navigation systems)		<b>58.7</b>
	Asia	4.7
	Europe	37.1
	North America	56.3
	Rest of World/Unspecified	1.9
		100.0
	VC	65.3
	PE	34.7

railway, road and marine systems), Telecommunication (including data transmission and navigation systems), Natural resources and energy (including oil, gas, tele-heating and electricity) and Renewable energy (renewable electricity). Social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals etc. are not included in our definition.

**4.3 Descriptive statistics**

After the sample selection process, the final sample contains 363 infrastructure and 11,223 non-infrastructure deals. As Franzoni et al. (2010) point out, the total CEPRES database can be considered representative for the global private-equity market. Differences between the infrastructure and non-infrastructure sample could thus reveal specifics of the infrastructure market.


Table 1 and Table 2 provide details on industry sectors, stages of investment and regions of investment. Table 1 shows that within the infrastructure sub-sample, the sector Telecommunication dominates (58.7 percent) followed by Natural resources & energy (24.8 percent), Transport (12.9 percent), whereas the number of Alternative energy deals is rather marginal (3.6 percent).

Table 2 shows a slight majority of venture capital (VC) over private equity (PE) deals (52.9 percent versus 47.1 percent) in the infrastructure sample. The dominance of venture capital is stronger in the non-infrastructure sectors (58.1 percent versus 41.9 percent). From Table 2 we also see that for the infrastructure market, European deals are as frequent as North American deals in our sample, whereas North-American deals clearly outnumber European deals in the non-infrastructure sub-sample. For comparison, the most comprehensive publicly-available private equity datasets Thomson Venture Expert and Capital IQ show that the overall private-equity market is largely dominated by North American deals (Lopez de Silanes et al. 2009, p. 9). Compared to that, European deals occur relatively more frequently in the infrastructure market as shown in Table 2, which reflects that the European market for infrastructure is more mature than the US market (OECD 2007, p. 32).

Table 2: Split of samples into regions and stages of investment (percent of total)

Region of investment	Percentage of deals within infrastructure sample (broken down by stage)	Percentage of deals within non-infrastructure sample (broken down by stage)
<b>All regions</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>
... Venture capital	52.9	58.1
... Private equity	47.1	41.9
<b>Asia</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>6.1</b>
VC	39.3	57.2
PE	60.7	42.8
<b>Europe</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>34.3</b>
VC	50.6	33.9
PE	49.4	66.1
<b>North America</b>	<b>43.0</b>	<b>57.8</b>
VC	61.5	73.4
PE	38.5	26.6
<b>Rest of World/Unspecified</b>	<b>6.3</b>	<b>1.8</b>
VC	26.1	30.4
PE	73.9	69.6

Figure 2. Distribution of deals over the sample period



Notes: The figure shows the number of deals per year of initial investment relative to the total number of deals in the whole sample period, for each sub-sample (infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals).

Table 3a. Duration of deals (in months)

Measure	Infra deals	Non-infra deals	Significance
Average	48.90	50.83	—
Median	41.00	46.00	*
Standard deviation	33.67	33.72	
Minimum	1.00	1.00	
Maximum	187.10	339.00	

Notes: Column "Significance" indicates whether the difference between the infrastructure and the non-infrastructure sample is significant, as measured by the test for difference in mean as well as on the non-parametric test for the equality of medians. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively; — denotes non-significance.

Finally, Figure 2 shows the frequencies of deals per year as a percentage of the total number of deals, thereby distinguishing between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals.

**5. Empirical results**

We now turn to the empirical results. We use the data described above to test the hypotheses outlined in Section 3.

**5.1 Asset characteristics**

H1: In order to test the hypothesis that infrastructure investments have longer time horizons, we look at the differences in duration of the deals. We expect that infrastructure deals have longer average durations compared to the non-infrastructure deals. The results in Table 3a show, however, that this is not the case, so we reject the hypothesis. We even find a shorter average duration for infrastructure deals (48.90 months) than for non-infrastructure deals (50.83 months) but the difference is not statistically significant. The finding that the time horizon of infrastructure deals is generally no longer than that of non-infrastructure deals also holds for the median. It also holds across stages of investment as illustrated in Table 3b.

Table 3b. Duration of deals by stage (in months)

Measure	Venture capital			Private equity		
	Infra	Non-infra	Significance	Infra	Non-infra	Significance
Average	45.85	48.04	—	52.46	54.70	—
Median	37.00	43.00	—	45.00	49.00	—
Standard deviation	33.30	33.24		33.85	34.00	
Minimum	1.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	
Maximum	187.00	219.00		150.00	339.00	

Notes: See Table 3a.

Table 4b. Size of deals by stage of investment (in million USD)

Measure	Venture capital			Private equity		
	Infra	Non-infra	Significance	Infra	Non-infra	Significance
Average	11.9	5.7	***	33.9	16.7	—
Median	4.7	2.9	**	9.6	6.1	***
Standard Deviation	18.3	9.4		114.2	35.9	
Minimum	0.0	0.0		0.03	0.0	
Maximum	146.0	148.0		1,401.9	952.0	

Notes: See Table 4a.

Table 4a. Size of deals (in million USD)

Table 4a. Size of deals (in million USD)


Measure	Infra deals	Non-infra deals	Significance
Average	22.2	10.3	***
Median	6.9	3.9	***
Standard Deviation	80.1	24.9	
Minimum	0.0	0.0	
Maximum	1,401.9	952.0	

Notes: Column "Significance" indicates whether the difference between the infrastructure and the non-infrastructure sub-sample is significant, as measured by the test for difference in mean as well as on the non-parametric test for the equality of medians. A minimum deal size of 0.0 represents a deal size of less than 100,000 USD. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively; — denotes non-significance.

This finding is surprising, considering the long average life span of infrastructure assets (Rickards 2008). In this regard, it is worth pointing out that our sample contains deals done by private-equity-type funds which typically have a duration of 10 to 12 years (Metrick and Yasuda 2010, p. 2305), constraining the time horizon of the investment. Typically, the life of an infrastructure asset will continue after the exit of the fund and thus can be much longer. Nevertheless, our finding is important. As most infrastructure funds raised nowadays have a typical private equity-type construction, the average duration of infrastructure deals of around four years shows that these funds do not typically incorporate the longevity of infrastructure assets.


H2: As frequently stated, infrastructure assets require large and often up-front investments (Sawant 2010b, p. 32). As we do not have information on the total size of the infrastructure assets in our data,

Figure 3a. Time profile of cash outflows from infrastructure and non- infrastructure deals: Shorter deals (1-100 months)



Notes: The figure shows the structure of the average cumulated capital outflows of the infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals over time.

Figure 3b. Time profile of cash outflows from infrastructure and non- infrastructure deals: Longer deals (101-200 months)



Notes: See Figure 3a.

we approximate capital requirement by deal size of the investments. Thereby, deal size measures the sum of all cash injections of a fund into the portfolio company between the initial investment and the exit. This is not equal to the size of the whole infrastructure asset. It just measures the size of the stake a single fund takes in the asset. Deal size provides a good indication for capital requirement assuming that on average, deal size increases with the size of an asset.

The results in Tables 4a and 4b show that infrastructure deals are, on average, more than twice the size of non-infrastructure deals. The larger size of infrastructure deals holds individually in each sub-sample, i.e. for venture capital and private equity deals. We therefore do not reject the hypothesis that infrastructure deals are larger than non-infrastructure deals.


**5.2 Risk-return profile**

H3: We now turn to the analysis of the variability of the infrastructure and non-infrastructure deal cash flows. In general, it is argued that infrastructure assets are bond-like investments that provide stable and predictable cash flows. Therefore, we would expect the sub-sample of infrastructure deals to exhibit lower cash flow variability than the non-infrastructure deals.

In order to analyze this hypothesis, we first need to construct an appropriate measure of cash flow variability. A very simple approach would be to measure cash flow variability by the volatility of cash outflows of an investment (see e.g. Cumming and Walz, 2009). However, this simple approach would neglect the fact that cash outflows of infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals are typically not identically distributed over time.


This is illustrated in Figures 3a and 3b by the S-shaped structure of the average cumulated capital outflows of the infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals over time. This S-shaped structure implies that average capital outflows

Figure 4a. Time profile of cash outflows from non-infrastructure deals: Bootstrapping results



Notes: The figure shows the simulation results for the structure of the cumulated capital outflows over time applying a bootstrap simulation with 50,000 draws. The figure depicts the mean, the 5th percentile and 95th percentile for the sub-sample with duration of 1-100 months. The confidence bounds suggest that the average structures can be measured with high precision and hence, that the structures shown in Figures 3a and 3b are representative for the sample deals.

Figure 4b. Time profile of cash outflows from infrastructure deals: Bootstrapping results



Notes: See Figure 4a.

Table 5. Variability of infrastructure and non-infrastructure cash outflows (in percent), by duration of deals

Measure	Full sample			Duration 1-100 months			Duration 101-200 months		
	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.
Average	13.21	12.96	—	13.44	13.25	—	11.63	10.95	—
Median	8.60	9.07	—	8.71	9.44	—	7.95	7.04	—
Standard Deviation	11.15	10.67		11.37	10.77		8.82	10.09	
Minimum	0.26	0.22		0.26	0.22		1.41	0.38	
Maximum	81.93	75.10		81.93	75.10		37.71	63.14	

Notes: The table displays the variability of cash outflows (in percent) for the full sample as well as separately for the sub-samples of shorter deals and longer-lasting deals. Column "Sign." indicates whether the difference between the infrastructure and non-infrastructure samples is significant, as measured by the test for difference in mean as well as on the non-parametric test for the equality of medians. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively; — denotes non-significance.

Table 6a. Historical default frequencies (in percent)

Measure	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	VC	PE	Sign.
Multiple = 0	14.60	18.84	***	25.85	8.87	***
Multiple < 1	33.06	46.74	***	58.60	29.82	***

Notes: "Multiple = 0" is the percentage of deals that were complete write-offs. "Multiple < 0" is the percentage of all loss-making deals. Column "Sign." displays the significance of the Chi-square test for independence between the infrastructure and the non-infrastructure sub-sample and between the VC and the PE sub-sample, respectively. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively.

Table 6b. Historical default rates (in percent), by sector and investment stage

Investment stage	Venture Capital			Private Equity			Significance VC versus PE		
	Sector	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	Infrastructure	Non-infrastructure
Multiple = 0		22.92	25.93	***	5.26	9.00	***	***	***
Multiple < 1		45.31	58.95	***	19.30	30.20	***	***	***

Notes: See Table 6a. The last two columns display, separately for infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals, the significance of the Chi-Square test for independence between the VC and the PE sub-samples.

are not stable over time; otherwise the function would be linear. Therefore, the dispersion around a constant mean is not an appropriate measure of cash flow variability.

A more appropriate measure of variability must account for the time-dependent means. We do this by measuring the cash flow volatility by the dispersion of the deal cash flows around the average structures given in Figures 3a and 3b. We use the infrastructure-specific average structure for calculating the variability of cash flows of infrastructure deals and use the non-infrastructure-specific average structure for non-infrastructure deals. This approach is only valid if the average structures shown in Figures 3a and 3b are representative of the sample deals. We verify this by a bootstrap simulation. The simulation results show that the mean structures can be measured with high precision, as indicated by the confidence bounds in Figures 4a and 4b.

Table 5 shows the empirical results. To account for the different durations of our sample deals, we construct two different cases: 1-100 denotes sample deals that have a duration between 1 and 100 months; 101-200 denotes

sample deals with a duration between 101 and 200 months. Using our measure of cash flow variability introduced above, we calculate the cash flow volatility for each of the deals in our samples. The cross-sectional means reported in Table 5 do not indicate that infrastructure investments offer more stable (in the sense of predictable) cash (out-) flows than non-infrastructure investments. In fact, the average and median variability of the infrastructure deals is even slightly higher for most sub-samples. But these differences are not statistically significant. Also, in a regression with the measure of variability as the dependent variable, we could not find evidence for a statistically significant difference between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that infrastructure fund investments offer more stable cash flows than non-infrastructure fund investments.

H4: Infrastructure assets are generally regarded as investments that exhibit low levels of risk. We analyze this hypothesis by comparing the default frequencies of infrastructure investments with those of non-infrastructure investments. We measure default frequencies by the fraction of sample deals with a multiple equal to zero and by

the fraction of deals with a multiple smaller than one. The first variable gives the proportion of complete write-off deals in the samples. The second variable indicates the proportion of deals where money was lost, i.e., the cash return from the investment was smaller than the cash the fund had injected into the portfolio company.

Overall, our results suggest that infrastructure deals show lower default frequencies. Table 6a reveals that there is a significant difference in default rates between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals for both measures applied. In addition, Table 6b shows that this is also the case for sub-samples of venture capital and private equity deals. These findings support the hypothesis that infrastructure investments show relatively low default rates (Inderst 2009, p. 7).

As infrastructure deals show relatively low levels of risk compared to non-infrastructure deals, the traditional view

Table 7a. Returns on investment

IRR (percent)	Infra	Non-infra	Sign.	VC	PE	Sign.
Average	66.88	20.15	***	7.41	41.36	***
Median	18.74	6.02	***	-20.01	25.47	***
Standard Deviation						
Minimum	299.71	197.21		224.34	162.33	
Maximum	-100.00	-100.00		-100.00	-100.00	
	3,503.80	4,870.08		4,870.00	4,533.97	
<b>Multiple</b>						
Average	2.69	2.46	—	2.13	2.93	***
Median	1.69	1.13	***	0.40	1.98	***
Standard Deviation	3.71	4.55		4.73	4.18	
Minimum	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00	
Maximum	40.26	50.00		49.92	50.00	

Notes: Descriptive statistics on IRR and multiple of infrastructure (infra) versus non-infrastructure (non-infra) deals and venture capital (VC) versus private equity (PE) deals. Column "Sign." displays the significance of the test for difference in mean as well as of the non-parametric test for the equality of medians between the infrastructure and the non-infrastructure sub-sample and between the VC and the PE sub-sample, respectively. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively; — denotes insignificance.

Table 7b. Returns on investment by sector and investment stage

IRR (percent)	Venture capital			Private equity			Significance VC versus PE	
	Infra	Non-Infra	Sign.	Infra	Non-Infra	Sign.	Infrastructure	Non-infrastructure
Average	45.73	6.27	*	90.68	39.54	**	*	***
Median	5.00	-21.94	***	36.06	25.16	***	***	***
Standard Deviation								
Minimum	305.93	221.39		291.64	155.28			
Maximum	-100.00	-100.00		-100.00	-100.00			
	2,224.88	4,870.08		3,503.79	4,533.97			
<b>Multiple</b>								
Average	2.17	2.13	—	3.27	2.92	*	***	***
Median	1.15	0.38	***	2.47	1.96	**	***	***
Standard Deviation	4.14	4.75		3.03	4.21			
Minimum	0.00	0.00		0.00	0.00			
Maximum	40.26	49.92		22.78	50.00			

Notes: See Table 7a. The last two columns display, separately for infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals, the significance of the tests for difference in mean and for the equality of medians between the VC and the PE sub-sample.

Table 8. Regression results: All deals

Model 1: OLS (all deals)			Model 2: Probit (all deals)		
Dependent variable: IRR			Dependent variable: DEFAULT		
Variable	Coefficient (t-statistic)		Variable	Coefficient (z-statistic)	
LN_GENERATION	0.67 (0.91)		LN_GENERATION	0.02 (0.93)	
LN_FUNDSIZE	-1.64 (-2.47)	**	LN_FUNDSIZE	-0.06 (-2.49)	**
PE	22.27 (14.30)	***	PE	-0.42 (-7.73)	***
LN_NUMBER	-31.58 (-35.35)	***	LN_NUMBER	1.22 (32.92)	***
LN_DURATION	26.74 (52.25)	***	LN_DURATION	-1.23 (-38.90)	***
LN_SIZE	2.85 (4.91)	***	LN_SIZE	0.01 (0.77)	
ASIA	4.86 (1.87)	*	ASIA	-0.19 (-2.15)	**
EUROPE	20.77 (10.17)	***	EUROPE	-0.45 (-6.48)	***
INFRA	12.15 (3.76)	***	INFRA	-0.36 (-6.48)	***
INFLATION	-1.89 (-1.42)		INFLATION	0.01 (0.16)	
GDP	2.00 (3.14)	***	GDP	0.080 (3.21)	***
PUBL_MKT_PERF	-0.001 (-0.20)		PUBL_MKT_PERF	-0.002 (-4.16)	***
RISKFREERATE	-3.98 (-10.72)	***	RISKFREERATE	0.09 (32.92)	***
LN_COMMITTED_CAP	-13.00 (-12.70)	***	LN_COMMITTED_CAP	0.05 (1.66)	*
INVEST00	-0.91 (-0.49)		INVEST00	0.23 (3.67)	***
CONSTANT	40.05 (2.72)	***	CONSTANT	0.90 (1.82)	*
# observations	8,607		# observations	9,329	
F(16, 8,591)	513.15	***	LR chi2(15)	4,627.09	***
Max. VIF	3.31		Max. VIF	3.21	
R2	34.70%		Pseudo R2	48.95%	

Notes: Results of the regressions for the full sample (infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals). Model 1 is an OLS regression with the IRR as dependent variable using White's heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators. Model 2 is a Probit regression with the dummy variable DEFAULT as dependent variable. DEFAULT equals 1 for deals with a multiple of zero; and 0 otherwise. The independent variables are listed in the first column. The second column shows the non-standardized coefficients of each exogenous variable and the associated t-/z-statistics. The asterisks in the third column indicate the level of significance (\*, \*\*, \*\*\* significant at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively).



is that their returns tend to be lower, too. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics in Tables 7a and 7b show higher average and median returns for the infrastructure deals, as measured by the investment multiples and internal rates of return (IRR). This result also holds for each of the VC and PE sub-samples, and most differences are statistically highly significant.

To further scrutinize these findings on differences in risk and return, we perform a regression of the IRR (Table 8, Model 1) and of the dummy variable DEFAULT (Table 8, Model 2) on several fund- and deal-specific variables as well as macroeconomic factors. For this purpose we eliminate deals at and above the 95th percentile of the IRR due to the high dispersion as can be seen in Tables 7a and 7b. The reasoning is that these outliers might be subject to data errors. Both regressions meet the standard OLS conditions and have high explanatory power with an R-squared of 34.70 percent and a Pseudo R-squared of 48.95 percent, respectively.

Model 1 confirms that infrastructure deals significantly outperform non-infrastructure deals, as can be seen in the positive coefficient of variable INFRA. In turn, Model 2 confirms that the likelihood of default is significantly smaller for infrastructure deals than for non-infrastructure deals (negative coefficient of variable INFRA).

One reason why we find higher return and lower risk might be that, in our analyses, we apply total cash flows and not operating cash flows and thus, we measure equity and not asset risk. As we will show later, there is evidence that infrastructure assets have higher leverage than non-infrastructure assets. Higher leverage, in turn, implies increased market risk and thus requires higher equity returns. However, as we do not know deal-specific leverage levels, we cannot infer whether the higher returns observed for infrastructure deals are just a fair compensation for higher market risk or whether they indicate true out-performance. It is nevertheless striking that we find higher returns and lower stand-alone risk for infrastructure investments.

H5: After having seen significant differences in risk and return between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals, we now test whether greenfield and brownfield investments within the infrastructure universe exhibit different risk and return profiles. Our data do not contain the explicit information whether a portfolio company is a greenfield or brownfield investment. We approximate this by using the information whether a deal is a venture capital or private equity deal. Venture capital typically refers to deals involving portfolio companies at an early development stage. In contrast, private equity refers to deals involving portfolio companies at a later development stage. This approximation matches the typical descriptions of greenfield and brownfield investments (see Section 3 above). Beeferman (2008, p. 6) even defines greenfield and brownfield investments as early and late-stage investments, which makes the analogy to venture capital and private equity even more obvious. Therefore, taking VC and PE as an approximation for greenfield and brownfield seems to be a reasonable assumption.

We find that brownfield investments are less risky than greenfield investments. This is expressed by consistently and significantly lower default frequencies across sub-samples in Tables 8a and 8b. In addition, it is interesting to observe the significant difference in performance between greenfield and brownfield investments, as shown in Tables 7a and 7b. Brownfield investments show higher average and median performance, regardless whether measured by IRR or the multiple. The differences are statistically significant across sub-samples, too. These findings are consistent with other studies on private equity (e.g. the studies at fund level by Kaplan and Schoar 2005 and Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003). Similar to the comparison between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals above, we find higher returns for the assets with lower risk.

The regression analysis in Table 8 enables us to check whether these significant differences remain when controlling

Table 9. Regression results: Infrastructure versus non-infrastructure deals

Model 3: OLS (infrastructure deals)			Model 4: OLS (non-Infrastructure deals)		
Dependent variable: IRR			Dependent variable: IRR		
Variable	Coefficient (t-statistic)		Variable	Coefficient (t-statistic)	
LN_GENERATION	3.35 (0.77)		LN_GENERATION	0.93 (1.24)	
LN_FUNDSIZE	-1.73 (-0.47)		LN_FUNDSIZE	-1.71 (-2.55)	**
PE	27.14 (3.79)	***	PE	20.92 (12.75)	***
LN_NUMBER	-29.81 (-7.37)	***	LN_NUMBER	-31.57 (-34.20)	***
LN_DURATION	26.50 (9.02)	***	LN_DURATION	26.68 (51.20)	***
LN_SIZE	2.24 (0.61)		LN_SIZE	2.81 (4.84)	***
ASIA	0.37 (0.04)		ASIA	4.95 (1.84)	*
EUROPE	35.40 (3.07)	***	EUROPE	19.57 (9.28)	***
INFRA_NAT_RES_ENERGY	1.55 (0.19)		---	---	
INFRA_TRANSPORT	24.32 (2.18)	**	---	---	
---	---		NAT_RES_ENERGY	8.21 (1.01)	
---	---		INDUSTRIAL	5.06 (3.20)	***
---	---		HEALTHCARE	3.17 (1.05)	
---	---		TELECOM	0.82 (0.33)	
INFLATION	3.29 (0.42)		INFLATION	-1.73 (-1.28)	
GDP	1.74 (0.66)		GDP	2.09 (3.22)	***
PUBL_MKT_PERF	0.13 (3.74)	***	PUBL_MKT_PERF	-0.005 (-0.75)	
RISKFREEERATE	-4.92 (-2.60)	**	RISKFREEERATE	-3.96 (-10.52)	***
LN_COMMITTED_CAP	3.82 (0.74)		LN_COMMITTED_C	-13.30 (-12.67)	***
INVEST00	-19.01 (-1.67)	*	INVEST00	0.26 (0.14)	
CONSTANT	-152.13 (-1.55)		CONSTANT	42.17 (2.82)	***
Number of observations	269		Number of observations	8,338	
F(16, 252)	23.05	***	F(18, 8,319)	415.85	***
Max. VIF	4.66		Max. VIF	3.32	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.462		R <sup>2</sup>	0.346	

Notes: Results of the OLS regressions for the infrastructure (Model 3) and the non-infrastructure sample (Model 4) with the IRR as dependent variable. Both use White's heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators. The independent variables are listed in the first column. The second column shows the non-standardized coefficients of each exogenous variable and the associated t-/z-statistics. The asterisks in the third column indicate the level of significance (\*, \*\*, \*\*\* significant at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively).

for a number of deal, fund and macroeconomic characteristics. Model 1 confirms that PE deals significantly outperform VC deals, as reflected by the positive coefficient of variable PE. Likewise, Model 2 confirms that the likelihood of default is significantly smaller for PE deals than for VC deals (negative coefficient of variable PE).

### 5.3 Performance drivers

As shown in Sub-section 5.2, we find significant differences in the performance of infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals. We now turn to the question which variables drive these results and how the drivers of performance differ between the infrastructure and non-infrastructure sub-samples. In order to address these questions, we again eliminate deals at the 95th percentile of the IRR and regress the IRR on several fund- and deal-specific variables as well as macroeconomic factors. However, we now perform separate regressions for the infrastructure and non-infrastructure sub-samples. For each sub-sample we include infrastructure- and non-infrastructure-specific dummy variables that control for the sector. The results of this exercise are shown in Models 3 and 4 in Table 9. Both regressions meet the standard OLS conditions and have high explanatory power with an R-squared of 46.2 percent and 34.6 percent, respectively.

*H6:* It has been shown in the literature that a high inflow of capital into the market for private equity at the time of investment drives up asset prices because of the increased competition for attractive deals. This, in turn, results in a poor performance of the deals, an effect that is often referred to as the “money chasing deals” phenomenon (Gompers and Lerner 2000; Diller and Kaserer 2009). In our regressions, capital inflows are measured by the variable LN\_COMMITTED\_CAP. Interestingly, the regression results indicate a clear difference between the two sub-samples. In particular, the coefficient for non-infrastructure deals (-13.30) is highly significant and negative, whereas the coefficient for infrastructure deals (3.82) is not significantly different from zero. This confirms that the capital inflows into private equity markets at the time of initial investment have a strong adverse influence on the performance of non-infrastructure deals. Since the same does not hold for infrastructure deals, we do not observe overinvestment in infrastructure fund investments caused by capital inflows into the private-equity market.

*H7:* It is commonly argued that infrastructure investments provide inflation-linked returns. The coefficient of the variable INFLATION is positive for the infrastructure sample (3.29) whereas it is negative for the non-infrastructure sample (-1.73). This would indicate evidence in favour of the hypothesis that infrastructure fund investments would provide a better inflation-linkage of returns than non-infrastructure investments. However, neither coefficient is statistically significant. This is in line with Sawant (2010b) who does not find a significant correlation between inflation and return for listed infrastructure stocks either. By contrast, Martin (2010), p. 24, finds that infrastructure can provide a long-term hedge against inflation for an investor provided the ongoing cash flows are at least partially linked to the price level.

*H8:* We can clearly reject the hypothesis that returns on infrastructure fund investments are uncorrelated to the performance of public equity markets. Models 3 and 4 in Table 9 show that the coefficient of the variable PUBL\_MKT\_PERF is positive (0.13) and statistically significant for the infrastructure sub-sample, whereas it is negative and not statistically significant for the non-infrastructure sub-sample. Therefore, the hypothesis of returns uncorrelated to equity markets holds for non-infrastructure deals but not for infrastructure deals. A special diversification benefit of infrastructure fund investments in the context of financial portfolio choice can thus not be confirmed.

On the other hand, the coefficient of the variable GDP is not statistically significant (albeit positive at 1.74) for the infrastructure sub-sample (Model 3) while it is positive (2.09) and statistically significant for the non-infrastructure

sample (Model 4). This supports the hypothesis that infrastructure fund investments offer returns that are uncorrelated to the macroeconomic development.

### 5.4 Other performance drivers

Having tested all our infrastructure-specific hypotheses stated in Section 3, we now outline several other interesting findings from our regressions in Table 9.

**Interest rate sensitivity.** We find a negative influence of the short-term interest rate at the date of investment on performance. The coefficients for the variable RISKFREEERATE are negative and statistically highly significant for both samples. This negative relationship has also been pointed out in earlier studies (e.g. Ljungqvist and Richardson 2003). In addition, we find that the coefficient for the infrastructure sample (-4.92) is more negative compared with that of the non-infrastructure sample (-3.96). That is, the performance of infrastructure deals is more sensitive to interest rate changes.

A possible explanation for this is that infrastructure investments have higher leverage ratios than non-infrastructure investments. This is intuitive since the cost of debt is usually directly related to the risk-free rate while this may not necessarily be true for the cost of equity. A higher cost of debt implies a higher cost of capital for a levered portfolio company, which implies a lower return, expressed by a lower IRR in our regression. Unfortunately, we do not have explicit information on leverage ratios in our data. However, the view that the higher regression coefficient for infrastructure deals reflects higher leverage ratios is supported by several other studies. For example, Bucks (2003) reports an average leverage of up to 83 percent in the water and energy sectors compared with 57 percent in other sectors in 2003. Ramamurti and Doh (2004, p. 161) report leverage of up to 75 percent in the infrastructure sector in general and Beferman (2008, p. 9) lists average leverage ranging from 50 percent for toll roads and airports to 65 percent for utilities and even 90 percent for social infrastructure, all of which refer to the level of individual assets. Orr (2007, p. 7) reports an additional leverage of up to 80 percent at fund level whereby the source of returns comes, to a large proportion, from financial structuring. Helm and Tindall (2009, p. 415) identify the late 1990s as a time where the scale of leverage and financial engineering peaked, especially in the utilities sector. The following time of historically low interest rates combined with the benefit of tax shield effects and thus, a lower weighted average cost of capital also benefited the use of debt.

**Fund manager experience.** At fund level, the variable LN\_GENERATION measures the number of funds the investment manager has operated prior to the current fund that invests in the specific deal. It may be seen as a proxy for the experience of the investment manager, which may be an important performance driver as several studies on private equity suggest (Achleitner et al. 2010). In contrast, our regression results reveal that the experience of the investment manager has no significant influence on either of the sub-samples in Models 3 and 4 in Table 9.

**Duration of deals.** At deal level, we can see that the duration of deals has a significant effect on returns in both sub-samples. The coefficients of the variable LN\_DURATION are significant, positive and similarly large in value. The economic rationale behind this result is that badly-performing deals are typically exited more quickly than well-performing deals, such that deals with a longer duration also show a higher IRR (Buchner et al. 2010; Krohmer et al. 2009).

**Number of financing rounds.** A similar result is found for the variable LN\_NUMBER. This variable measures the total number of cash injections a portfolio company has received from the fund and may be seen as a proxy for

the number of financing rounds. In our regression, the number of financing rounds has a significantly negative influence on performance in both sub-samples, i.e., the more often the fund manager invests additional equity into a deal, the lower the IRR. This is referred to as “staging” and is extensively discussed in the literature (Sahlmann 1990; Krohmer et al. 2009). Consistent with our results, Krohmer et al. (2009) argue that badly-performing companies need to “gamble for resurrection” more often in order to get additional cash injections from fund managers. Therefore, there is a negative relationship between number of financing rounds and performance.

**Deal size.** Models 3 and 4 in Table 9 show that the size of a non-infrastructure deal has a significant positive influence on its IRR, despite controlling for the fund size, whereas this is not the case for infrastructure deals. This is shown by a highly significant coefficient for LN\_SIZE of 2.81 for the non-infrastructure and by an insignificant coefficient of 2.24 for the infrastructure sub-sample. Also Franzoni et al. (2010) find a positive influence of deal size on performance. They explain this effect with an illiquidity premium that is increasing in deal size. From a theoretical perspective, it is unclear why deal size should have an impact on performance. In this paper we cannot control for the illiquidity premium hypothesis mentioned by Franzoni et al. (2010). Furthermore, we cannot control to what extent deal size is a proxy for other performance-related variables such as deal risk or management experience. Hence, we can hardly explain this finding. Still, it is noteworthy that the size effect is not present in infrastructure deals.

**Regional differences.** In terms of regional influences, we observe that deals made in Europe – one of the most mature infrastructure markets besides Australia and Canada (OECD 2007, p. 32) – significantly outperform deals in other regions. Infrastructure deals show an even larger spread, with European infrastructure deals, on average, having an IRR that is 35.40 percentage points higher than in other regions as indicated by the dummy variable EUROPE. This effect is much smaller for European non-infrastructure deals with 19.57 percentage points. Lopez de Silanes et al. (2009) also report a higher performance for private-equity deals in Europe excluding the UK.

A rationale for this difference might be that Europe has seen the largest volume in privatizations, especially in the infrastructure sectors (e.g. Brune et al. 2004; Clifton et al. 2006, pp. 745-751). Therefore, the proportion of deals involving privatization is likely to be much higher in the sub-sample of European infrastructure deals than in the other sub-samples. Three explanations why such sales of assets from the public to private investors could have delivered higher returns include that i) a government or municipality might not have the objective to maximize the sale price of an asset, but instead tries to make the sale succeed in the first place; ii) management of newly privatized companies often negotiated large capital and operational expenditures with regulators before privatization but cut these expenditures back afterwards (Helm and Tindall 2009, pp. 420-421); and iii) after the formerly state-owned companies with low leverage were privatized, the new owners increased the leverage to lower the weighted average cost of capital and thus the return on the asset instead of using it for real capital investments (Helm 2009, p. 319).

Privatizations usually take place via private placements, tenders or fixed-price sales. Regarding the latter, there is empirical evidence that under-pricing is larger at privatizations than at private-company IPOs and larger in regulated than in unregulated industries (Dewenter and Malatesta 1997). These empirical and theoretical findings support the idea that there are higher returns for privatizations of infrastructure assets in Europe in general.

The same line of argument might also hold for our empirical finding of high returns of private equity-type infrastructure deals. Hall (2006, p. 8) points out the increasing importance of private equity and infrastructure funds as buyers of privatized companies in Europe, strengthening the link between our empirical findings and the mechanisms of privatization mentioned above.

**Differences in returns within the infrastructure sector.** The highly significant and positive coefficient of the variable TRANSPORT in Model 3 reveals that transport infrastructure assets (e.g. airports, marine ports or toll roads) exhibit IRRs above the average – and by a wide margin – while assets in Natural resources and energy do not. On average, deals in the transportation sector yield an IRR that is 24.32 percentage points higher than other infrastructure deals. The reason for this might be that the transportation sector is subject to a high degree of government intervention and thus, discretionary power (Yarrow et al. 1986, p. 340), while at the same time being less subject to independent regulation than other infrastructure sectors such as utilities. Indeed, Égert et al. (2009, p. 70) show in a survey that independent regulators are far less common in the transportation sector than in the electricity, gas, water or even telecommunication sectors. Less stability and credibility given by a regulatory framework, in turn, leads to higher investment uncertainty – including higher price and quantity risk – for which an investor requires a higher rate of return (Égert et al. 2009, pp. 31-32). The latter is in line with our empirical finding.

Within the non-infrastructure sample, we can see that a wider range of industries have a significantly higher IRR as shown by the variable INDUSTRIAL in Model 4. However, the coefficient is economically rather small.

## 6. Summary

We have scrutinized the risk- and return profile of unlisted infrastructure investments and have compared them to non-infrastructure investments. It is widely believed that infrastructure investments offer some typical financial characteristics such as long-term, stable and predictable, inflation-linked returns with low correlation to other assets. To some extent, our findings corroborate this view. However, we also document some results that are not in accordance with this perception.

By using a unique dataset of infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals made by private-equity-like investment funds, we have come up with the following results. First, in terms of risk differences between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals, results are a bit mixed. We do not find any evidence supporting the hypothesis that infrastructure investments offer more stable cash (out-) flows than non-infrastructure investments. It appears to be true, however, that default risk – or downside risk more generally – is significantly lower in infrastructure investments than in non-infrastructure investments.

Second, as far as returns are concerned, we do find higher average and median returns for infrastructure deals, as measured by the investment multiples and internal rates of return. This result also holds when separating the sample into venture capital and private-equity deals, and most differences are statistically significant. This is an interesting finding as it contradicts the traditional view that infrastructure investments exhibit low levels of risk and, consequently, provide only moderate returns.

Third, there is some evidence that the higher average returns reflect higher market risk. For one thing, our sample contains only equity investments, and leverage ratios of infrastructure portfolio companies are higher than for their non-infrastructure counterparts. For another, returns to infrastructure fund investments are more strongly correlated with the performance of public-equity markets than returns to non-infrastructure fund investments.

Fourth, European infrastructure investments are found to have consistently higher returns than their non-European counterparts. We hypothesize that this might be related to the fact that Europe has seen the largest volume of privatizations, especially in the infrastructure sectors. It could well be that the ex ante return expectation in privatization transactions is higher, either because of defective privatization mechanisms or because of higher political risk. Concerning the latter, we find some evidence that the regulatory environment has an

impact on returns. Specifically, deals in the transportation sector have significantly higher returns than those in other infrastructure sectors, probably reflecting less independent regulation and hence, higher political risk in transportation as compared to the utilities or energy sectors.

Fifth, our empirical results do not support some other claims made in the literature. In particular, returns to infrastructure funds are not linked to inflation and do not depend on management experience, and their cash flow durations are not any different from those of non-infrastructure deals. It is also interesting to see that, unlike other venture capital and private-equity transactions, infrastructure investments do not appear to be subject to the so-called "money chasing deals" phenomenon.

Thus, the allegedly bond-like characteristics of infrastructure deals have not been confirmed. This is shown by the fact that infrastructure investments do not offer longer-term or more stable cash flows than non-infrastructure investments. The returns showing a positive correlation to public-equity markets and no inflation linkage also point to equity-like rather than bond-like characteristics.

Summing up, our paper supports the perception that infrastructure investments do have special characteristics that are of interest for institutional investors. Lower downside risk is certainly an important feature in this context. However, it is unlikely that the infrastructure market offers a free lunch. Even though it is true that returns have been attractive in the past, it cannot be ruled out that these returns are driven by higher market risk. Our results, offer some evidence in favour of this hypothesis. But a more general picture of the infrastructure market is still needed. Especially the influence of regulatory and political risk needs to be better understood. In this regard, our paper offers some limited evidence that can be used as a starting point for future research.

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